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T.: Pleading and Practice--Nonsuit after Motion to Direct a Verdict
RECENT CASE COMMENTS
Judge Kenna concurred in the result, in the instant case, because defendant alone, not plaintiff or the court, had the duty to
limit the effect of the evidence, and he failed to ask for an instruction, the general objection alone not barring the evidence since
it was admissible to show the balance due. He did not argue however that the colloquy between the trial judge and the attorneys
as to the purpose of the evidence prevented the jury's being misled, but asserted that such a proposition is "a wide departure from
well settled principles of jury deliberation and that if followed
hereafter, the consequence will be quite confusing." 8
The jury may occasionally but frequently and indeed usually,
it does not understand the effect of objections and statements of
attorneys. It depends upon the court's instructions to learn the
effect of the claims and arguments of counsel. No authority has
been cited or found in support of the majority opinion that objections and statements of counsel may sufficiently apprise the
jury as to the effect of evidence. It is submitted that the approach
of the concurring opinion is more reasonable than that of the majority opinion.
HI. L. W., JR.
PLEADING AND PRACTICE -

VERDICT. -

Issue was

NONSUIT AFTER MOTION TO DIRECT A

joined on a plea of "not guilty" in an action

of trespass on the case, and a jury was impaneled to try the case.
After the plaintiff had introduced his evidence, the court retired
to chambers where the defendant moved for a directed verdict.
Before the court directed the jury to return the verdict for the
defendant, but after it had sustained the motion, the plaintiff
moved for a nonsuit, but was denied. Held, that this was an error,
thus permitted a nonsuit to be taken after the court had sustained
a motion to direct. Lykens v. Jarrett.'
At common law a party could take a nonsuit at any time before the verdict.2 The West Virginia statute has limited the time for
a nonsuit, 3 requiring it to be taken before the jury retires from
the bar. Where the case is heard by the court in lieu of a.jury,
this statute has been construed to mean that the nonsuit must be
moRE, EvmEiw-CE § 13. Contra: Harrison v. Garrett, 132 N. C. 172, 43 S. E. 594

(1903).

8 Leftwich v. Inter-Ocean Casualty Co., 17 S. E. (2d) 209, 213 (W. Va. 1941).
117 S. E. (2d) 328 (W. Va. 1941).
2

fDaube v. Kuppenheimer, 272 Ill.
350, 112 N. E. 61 (1916).
a W. VA. CODE (MAichie, 1937) c. 56, art. 6, § 25.
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taken before the case has been submitted to the court for decision.
However, a problem arises where there is a hybrid procedure involving both the jury and the court, as where a demurrer to the
evidence or a motion to direct has been interposed. Our court has
held that where there is a demurrer to the evidence and a jury is
impaneled to assess the damages, the nonsuit cannot be taken after
the jury retires from the bar5 There is a conflict of authority as
to whether the party may take a nonsuit after the court has ruled
on the motion to direct. Some courts, as did the court in the instant case, treat this as a jury trial, and a nonsuit may be taken any
time before the jury retires.8 Other courts feel that a motion to
direct takes the case from the jury, and a nonsuit cannot be taken
7
after the motion is submitted to the court for a decision. These
courts reason that after the motion is sustained, the function of
the jury is purely ministerial, and serves no purpose other than
3
registering the will of the trial judge and giving form to the record.
Our court has previously stated that a finding in a directed verdict
is just as surely a finding of the court as if the matter had been
heard by the court in lieu of a jury. The jury's action is mere form,
brought about by the fact that it had been impaneled to try the
case, and does not amount to a verdict in the common acceptation
of trials by jury.9 It would seem to follow that if the court had
applied this reasoning, the nonsuit would not have been allowed
4Commonwealth Pipe & Supply Co. v. Nitro Products Corp., 95 W. Va. 13,
120 S.E. 174 (1923).
5Frymier v. Loraina R.R., 86 W. Va. 519, 103 S. E. 366 (1920).
' Barrett v. Virginian Ry., 250 U. S. 473, 39 S. Ct. 540, 63 L. Ed. 1092
(1919) ; West Coast Fruit Co. v. Hackney, 98 Ila. 382, 123 So. 758 (1929);
App. 624 (1928); Van Sant
Sweet-Orr & Co. v. E. G. Hendrickson Co., 248 Ill.
v. Wentworth, 60 md. App. 591, 108 N. E. 975 (1915); Darby v. Pidgeon
Thomas Iron Co., 144 Tenn. 298, 232 S. W. 75 (1921); dissenting opinion of
Ritz, J., in State v. Damron, Judge, 85 W. Va. 619, 622, 102 S. E. 238, 239
(1920).
7Marion v. Home Mutual Ins. Ass'n of Iowa, 205 Iowa 1300, 217 N. W. 803
(1928); Schaffer v. Deemer Mfg. Co., 108 Miss. 257, 66 So. 736 (1914); Bee
Bldg. Co. v. Dalton, 68 Neb. 38, 93 N. W. 930 (1903) ;'Weaver v. Whalen, 56
Ohio App. 35, 9 N. E. (2d) 1016 (1937); Turner v. Pope Motor Co., 79 Ohio
St. 153, 86 IT. E. 651 (1908) ; Cherniak v. Prudential Ins. Co., 339 Pa. 73, 14
A. (2d) 334 (1940).
S Marion v. Home Mutual Ins. Ass'n of Iowa, 205 Iowa 1300, 1303, 217 N.
W. 803 (1928); Cherniak v. Prudential Ins. Co., 339 Pa. 73, 75, 14 A. (2d)
334 (1940). After the judge states he will have to direct a verdict, "it would
be absurd to hold that in the instant that elapses between the judge's declaration as to what direction he has decided to give and his actual giving of that
direction, a plaintiff may take a voluntary
1 nonsuit. This would reduce the trial
of cases, in this feature of them at least, to a mere game of verbal 'base runningB.V
9 Breedlove V. Galloway, 109 W. Va. 144, 166, 153 S. E. 298 (1930).
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after the court had ruled on the motion to direct, for a nonsuit
cannot be taken after the case has been submitted to the court for
decision.
B. D. T.
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sioN. - Injunction proceedings against a former tenant and a landlord were instituted in the name of the State under a statute,'
designed to prevent the use of premises for purposes of prostitution,
therein defined to constitute a nuisance, and to provide for collecting penalties from occupants and owners of such premises.
Held, that injunction and an order padlocking the building should
issue even though the owner did not know of this nuisance maintained by his tenant. State v. Navy.2
Is a judicial construction of such statutes, which imposes a
penalty upon the owner of the premises on which the nuisance is
maintained, despite the owner's ignorance of the nuisance a proper
one? Some courts permit abatement of the nuisance by injunction
against the owner to restrain continuance, although he bad no
knowledge of its existence.' Others expand the operation of the
statute to allow abatement of the nuisance and also closing of the
house for a definite period regardless of the owner's lack of knowledge. 4 Liability thus divorced from knowledge ordinarily rests
upon the theory that the action is in rem.' As an incident to abatement property so used as to bring it within the nuisance statute,
may if personal, be confiscated, and if real, subjected to the consequences of reasonable forfeitures, without reference to the owner's unawareness of its use for the unlawful purpose.'
. VA. CODE (Michie, 1937) c. 61, art. 9, §§ 1-11.
S. E. (2d) 626 (W. Va. 1941).
3 Martin v. Blattner, 68 Iowa 286, 25 N. W. 131 (1886) ; State v. Fanning,
96 Neb. 123, 147 N. W. 215 (1914); Moore v. State, 107 Ten. 490, 181 S. W.
217

438 (1915).
4 People v. Casa Co., 35 Cal. App. 194, 169 Pac. 454 (1917); People v.
Barbiere, 33 Cal. App. 770, 166 Pac. 813 (1917); of. Tenement House Dept. v.
McDevitt, 215 N. Y. 160, 109 N. E. 88 (1015) (penalty sustained against
owner of tenement house).
People v. Barbiere, 33 Cal. App. 770, 166 Pac. 812 (1917).
6 People v. Casa Co., 35 Cal. App. 194, 169 Pac. 454 (1917) (the suppression
of a nuisance is essentially a proeeding in rem operating upon the property used
in the maintenance of the nuisance, and while the owner having no actual
knowledge of the character of the business carried on in his building might not
personally be bound for costs, the building and furniture may be proceeded
against and subjected to forfeitures prescribed by the state); State v. Chambers, 131 Minn. 349, 154 N. W. 1073 (1915).
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